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Abstract
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) is a menace for service provider and prominent issue in network
security. Defeating or defending the DDoS is a prime challenge. DDoS make a service unavailable for a certain
time. This phenomenon harms the service providers, and hence, loss of business revenue. Therefore, DDoS
is a grand challenge to defeat. There are numerous mechanism to defend DDoS, however, this paper surveys
the deployment of Bloom Filter in defending a DDoS attack. The Bloom Filter is a probabilistic data structure
for membership query that returns either true or false. Bloom Filter uses tiny memory to store information
of large data. Therefore, packet information is stored in Bloom Filter to defend and defeat DDoS. This paper
presents a survey on DDoS defending technique using Bloom Filter.
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1. Introduction
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) is a prominent
issue in Network Security and it is extremely horrible
threats for datacenters. The menace of DDoS has
documented at University of Minnesota in 1991,
made the system unable to serve for two days [21].
In 2000, many media and famous companies were
attacked, such as eBay, CNN, Yahoo and Amazon
[11]. Usually, the DDoS attacker attacks such big
companies is to make them suffer from financial
losses. The losses may range to millions when they
are unavailable for a few seconds [3]. In 2010, DDoS
attack has done to shut down websites such as Visa,
Mastercard, PostFinance, and PayPal. Many Industries,
and organizations have experienced the similar kind
of peril tactics. DDoS dissatisfies on these companies
for banning the donations to WikiLeaks [1]. Moreover,
there is also evidence of politically driven attack such
as the most famous attack on White House Website in
2002 [10]. Also, many governmental websites are shut
down during the Gezi Park revolt in Turkey [39].
There are two ways to prevent the DDoS attack,
namely, machine learning and Bloom Filter. This survey
focuses on Bloom Filter to prevent DDoS attack.
∗Ripon Patgiri, Corresponding author. Email: ripon@cse.nits.ac.in,
sabuzimanayak@gmail.com, samir@nits.ac.in
However, machine learning is intelligent to identify
patterns, and to identify legal and illegal requests. But,
Bloom Filter is unintelligent, hence, it cannot identify
patterns and unable to differentiate legal and illegal
accesses. Surprisingly, Bloom Filter is used to prevent
DDoS attack. Unlike machine learning algorithm,
Bloom Filter is very simple data structure that consume
a tiny amount of memory.
The Bloom Filter (BF) [5] is a probabilistic data
structure to check the presence of an element in
a set [14]. It is a data structure mostly used for
membership filtering. Bloom Filter either returns true
or false. The true result of Bloom Filter is classified
into two different classes, namely, true positive and
false positive. Similarly, the negative class is also
classified into two different classes, particularly, false
negative and true negatives. The false positive and
false negative is the overhead of the filter. AS per our
study, all Bloom Filter contains false positive. However,
there are a few variants of Bloom Filters contain false
negative. The delete operation creates a false negative
issue, therefore, many Bloom filters do not support the
deleting operation. But, it mostly occurs towards the
saturation of the Bloom Filter. Let, B be the Bloom Filter,
S be the set and K ∈ S where K = K1, K2, K3, . . . , Kn and
n is the total number of elements. All elements of S
are entered into the Bloom Filter B. Let Kj be any
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random query, and thus, false positive, true positive,
false negative and true negative are defined as follows-
• True Positive: If Kj ∈ B and Kj ∈ S, then Bloom
Filter B returns a true positive.
• False Positive: If Kj ∈ B and Kj < S, then Bloom
Filter B returns a false positive.
• False Negative: If Kj < B and Kj ∈ S, then Bloom
Filter B returns a false negative.
• True Negative: If Kj < B and Kj < S, then Bloom
Filter B returns a true negative.
Most of the Bloom Filter does not contain false
negative, however, counting variants of Bloom Filter
can encounter with false negative. A false positive/false
negative is an unsolvable issue for Bloom Filter. This
is an open problem that is nearly impossible to
solve. However, many researchers have reduced the
probability of false positive. Cuckoo Filter, for instance.
Bloom Filter is an unintelligent membership filter that
cannot identify patterns. On the contrary, the machine
learning algorithms are intelligent to identify patterns.
Both Bloom Filter and machine learning algorithm can
be deployed to defeat DDoS. Tactics are different to
achieve the same goal. In this study, machine learning
algorithm is out of scope.
Bloom Filter is attracting lots of attention from
academia, industry, and practitioner irrespective of
their research domain. Bloom Filter is used in various
domains, for instance, Bioinformatics [7, 16, 17, 29],
Data-intensive computing [6, 24], and Networking.
Thus, Bloom Filter is also used in Network Security.
DDoS, for instance. It requires an excellent tactic to
defend a DDoS attack using Bloom Filter. It also
depends on the designing a good defense mechanism
against DDoS attack. Hence, Bloom Filter is used to
create a smart defender of DDoS, however, Bloom Filter
is a dumb data structure. Surprisingly, most of the
researcher designs a DDoS defender using Bloom Filter.
It depends on the adaptation and designing the Bloom
Filter to build a smart defense mechanism of the DDoS.
The next section explores the deployment of Bloom
Filter as defender of DDoS. Many researchers successful
in defeating DDoS using Bloom Filter.
Finally, this paper presents the state-of-the-art DDoS
defense mechanism using Bloom Filter. Also, DDoS
attack is briefed. Moreover, DDoS defense mechanisms
using Bloom Filter are explored and exposed. There are
numerous research articles in DDoS defense mechanism
using Bloom Filter, however, a few articles have been
selected and reviewed. The DDoS defense mechanism
is presented in three domains, particularly, Computer
Network, Wireless Networks and Cloud Computing.
DDoS attack is horrifying threats in these three
domains. Moreover, this paper presents research issues
and challenges in designing DDoS defense mechanism
using Bloom Filter.
The article is organized as follows- Section 2
explores on DDoS and its types. Section 3 exposes
the deployment of Bloom Filter to defeat and defend
the DDoS attack. Also, Section 4 reveals the issues
and challenges in defeating and defending DDoS
using Bloom Filter. Finally, the article is concluded in
Section 5.
2. Distributed Denial-of-Service
In Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack, the
attacker floods the target host with millions of requests
per second, which makes it unable to serve the
legitimate users as depicted in Figure 1. Target host is
attacked from many virtual machines having different
IP addresses. The traffic produced by DDoS may be
in the range of hundreds of gigabits [37]. In 2016,
the highest traffic was recorded, 1 Terabits per second
[34]. The legitimate users are starved by these large
amounts of traffic per second. DDoS attack is launched
using two methods [30]- (a) Vulnerability Attack:
sending some malformed packets to victim nodes. It
confuses the protocol or the application running on
the victim node. (b) Flooding attack: (i) disturbing the
connectivity of legitimate users by exhausting router
processing capacity, bandwidth, or network resources.
This attack is network/transport-level flooding attacks.
(ii) Disturbing the services of legitimate users by
exhausting the server resources. Some server resources
are CPU, sockets, disk/database bandwidth, memory,
sockets, I/O bandwidth, etc. This attack is application-
level flooding attacks.
DDoS attacks are often launched by Zombies or
Botnet computers. The Zombies or Botnet computers
are remotely controlled, well organized, and widely
scattered. They concurrently and continuously send
service requests to victim nodes. Usually they are
recruited using Trojan horses, worms, or backdoors.
They also increase their defense against detection by
using spoofed IP addresses.
2.1. DDoS Attack features
There are many features which favor the DDoS attacker
and prevents developing effective defense mechanism
[33].
• A DDoS attack may generate a traffic of about
10 GB/sec. Many corporate Internet links and
network security devices are unable to handle
such high traffic.
• The attack sources comes from many distributed
geographical locations. It makes very difficult for
the IP traceback mechanism.
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Virtual Machines
Attacker Victim
Figure 1. DDoS attacker and victim. Attacker spawn several Virtual Machines to slowdown the Victim.
• As attack happened from multiple sources, the
traffic generated by each source is less. This
enables them to appear legitimate or as a flash
crowd. Hence, filtering attacker IP addresses is
difficult.
2.2. Types
There are five famous DDoS attacks, namely, TCP SYN
Flood attack, UDP Flood attack, SQL Slammer Worm
attack, DNS Amplification, and NTP attacks.
• In TCP SYN Flood attack [33], the attacker sends
a SYN packet from non-existing and not used IP
addresses. The server stores the request details
in memory stack and wait for confirmation from
the client as per three-way handshake protocol.
But the confirmation never comes. Many similar
requests cause the memory to fill up, making
it unable to serve the legitimate clients. There
are many tools for a DDoS attack, namely, TFN,
TFN2K, Stacheldraht, Shaft, and Trinity.
• In case of UDP flood [22], a large volume of
packets is sent to the victim host. The victim host
becomes busy in serving those requests and thus,
legitimate users are interrupted. In this attack,
the victim host becomes too busy to serve other
requests.
• SQL Slammer Worm [23] sends huge request to
random hosts. If the hosts share the same MS SQL
vulnerability, it gets infected and tries to infect
other hosts. Often, Trinoo is used to perform the
SQL Slammer Worm attack. The Slammer Worm
can infect 75,000 hosts in 30 minutes [31].
• In DNS Amplification attack [19], the attacker
hack the DNS and create a large size resource
record (RR). Then the attacker sends a request
from the victim IP address a request for that
RR. DNS sends the RR as response utilizing
huge bandwidth for the transfer making the DNS
unavailable.
• In NTP attack [8], the attacker first performs a
large scale scanning to identify the vulnerable
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amplifiers. An amplifier is defined as a host
running a protocol (e.g. NTP) which respond to
a query packet with one or more packets with size
greater than the query packet. When the attacker
identifies such vulnerable amplifiers, sends large
number of small UDP packets directly or via
intermediate hosts. Such large volume of traffic
saturates the bandwidth of the victim amplifier.
2.3. DDoS defense mechanism
The DDoS defense mechanism [33] is classified into
four broad categories, namely, attack prevention, attack
detection, attack source identification, and attack
reaction.
• Attack prevention tries to stop the attack before
the attack reaches the target host. Some examples
are Ingress/Egress6 filtering at the source edge
routers [35], Router-Based Packet Filtering [26].
• Attack detection detects the DDoS attack when it
occurs. Some defense mechanisms are MULTOPS
[13] and Anomaly-Based Detection [12].
• Attack source identification uses mechanisms to
find the source IP address to block them. IP
Traceback [4] is the most popular mechanism to
identify the attacker source IP address.
• Attack reaction aims to reduce or eliminate the
effect of the attack. Two main approaches [33]
are taken to react to DDoS attacks, host resource
management scheme and network resource man-
agement scheme.
3. Bloom Filter and DDoS
Bloom Filter is a dumb data structure, however,
it has a good space and time complexity which
has attracted many researchers to design the DDoS
defense mechanism and algorithms. In many defense
mechanisms, a Bloom filter is used to store the
malicious IP addresses. When a request comes, the
Bloom filter is looked up for the existence of the IP
address and decides whether the request is legitimate
or malicious. Therefore, a scalable Bloom Filter is
highly demanded to defend and defeat DDoS in a
very large scale network system. There is a continuous
network traffic flow in a router. The router requires a
highly scalable Bloom Filter to successfully store all the
information of the packet.
Bloom Filter either returns true or false. There are
numerous categories of Bloom Filters, however, Bloom
Filter is classified into two key categories, namely,
counting Bloom Filter and non-counting Bloom Filter.
Counting Bloom Filters counts the number of input
frequency, whereas the non-counting Bloom Filter
uses fingerprints or just binary bits. Counting Bloom
Filter is more scalable than non-counting Bloom Filter.
However, the false positive probability of counting
Bloom Filter is more than non-counting Bloom Filter.
Let m be the size of Bloom Filter, and n be the input
size and k be the number of hash functions, then the
probability of number of set bits in Bloom Filter is(
1 −
(
1 − 1
m
)nk)
(1)
F. Grandi [14] presents exact false positive probability
of conventional Bloom Filter using δ − transf ormation.
Let, X be the random variable represents the number of
set bits and conditioning the random variable by X = x,
then
P r(FP |X = x) =
( x
m
)k
(2)
Therefore, the total false positive probability is
FP P =
m∑
x=0
P r(FP |X = x) P r(X = x) (3)
FP P =
m∑
x=0
( x
m
)k
f (x) (4)
where f (x) probability mass function. F. Grandi [14]
calculates f (x) using δ − transf ormation. Thus, the
total false positive probability is
FP P =
m∑
x=0
( x
m
)k (m
x
) x∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
x
j
) (x − j
m
)nk
(5)
Equation (5) gives the exact false positive probability
of conventional Bloom Filter. The false positive
probability is an error in Bloom Filter. However, it is
negligible.
3.1. Computer network
Kavisankar et al. [20] proposed a SYN spoofing
Detection and Mitigation Scheme. A Bloom Filter is
used to store the legitimate IP addresses. All the
requesting IP address is checked for availability every
minute. These IP addresses are stored in a traffic log
for 24 hours. Among these addresses the peak sample
is considered for calculating the trust value. The trust
value is calculated using three events, (a) reliability
of network (b) behavior of node, and (c) recent status
of the network. The trust value helps to store the IP
Address in Bloom Filter. During DDoS attack Bloom
Filter is used to determine the trusted clients.
SkyShield [43] is a sketch based defense system
against application layer DDoS attack. It used two
Bloom Filter, one for storing legitimate hosts and
other for malicious hosts. The system does not retrieve
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the exact IP addresses of attacker site, and avoids
intensive computation. Sketch is a data structure
consist of multiple hash functions and a table. It helps
in aggregating data streams of higher dimension to
lesser dimension to efficiently estimate original signals.
SkyShield is deployed behind a network firewall. The
process has two stages mitigation and detection. During
mitigation phase two Bloom Filter, namely, whitelist
and blacklist. The whitelist contains the legitimate
hosts. And, they are confirmed using CAPTCHA
techniques. Malicious request is verified using blacklist
and the information is logged. Both Bloom Filters are
periodically flushed to prevent the blocking of the
sites forever. The legitimate request is forwarded to
detection stage. During the detection phase, anomalies
are detected by exploiting the divergence between the
two sketches as a signal. SkyShield is also able to detect
malicious request from normal request during flash
crowds.
An anti-DDoS technique[41] is proposed which
infuses self-learning to Bloom Filter. It combines both
the advantages of Bloom Filter and machine learning.
Initially, the packet is given to a machine learning
algorithm to extract the features. The configuration is
updated and given to Bloom Filter. The Bloom Filter
filters and allows only the legitimate packets using the
selected features.
Halagan et al. [15] proposed a SYN Flood attack
detection and identification algorithm using the
Counting Bloom Filter. A modified Counting Bloom
Filter is used, called MCBF. MCBF consist of a single
vector of counters. When a SYN packet is received
(half-open TCP connection starts), the independent
hash functions insert the IP address in MCBF and
increment the counter. When an ACK packet is
received (a connection is fully opened) the counter
is decremented. MCBF consist of two tables. These
tables have many long integer counters. First table
stores the source IP addresses and second table stores
the destination IP addresses. A detection algorithm
called S-Orthros collects SYN packets and confirm
the connection. Based on the analysis of S-Orthros,
the MCBF counter is incremented or decremented.
During normal connection, the MCBF remains empty.
However, during the flood attack, the MCBF structure
size increases very rapidly. The data stored in MCBF
help to detect the type of SYN flood attack - fixed,
random, subnet.
Shahsafi et al. [36] proposed a Bloom filter based
IP traceback method implemented in Netfilter. The
Netfilter [46] is an open source framework that
manipulates packets based on the Linux kernel.
Netfilter used handlers called hooks for filtering of
packets. The proposed IP traceback method uses a
NF_IP_FORWARD hook to implement Bloom filter. The
hook is placed in the path of the router where the packet
traverse. The first router which catches the packet insert
the Bloom filter to the packet based on its ID. The
proposed method uses a Standard Bloom filter. In the
IP header, the bloom filter is inserted into the “Option”
field. Each router’s ID is hashed to two values and
inserted in the packet Bloom filter. To identify the
attack, the hash values of the router given as input to
the packet Bloom filter are considered as a feature in
the packet. If the value is 0, the system is in normal
phase and the router insert or update their hashed ID
into the packet Bloom filter. However, if the value is
set, the router is in trace phase. The packet Bloom filter
and their hashed ID are compared to verify whether the
packet has been passed through this router before or
not. If the result is positive, then that packet is dropped.
Exhaust [2] is a software-based pattern matching
algorithm to save the host from DDoS attack. It is
based on Wu-Manber pattern matching algorithm. It
uses Bloom filters to reduce the number of queries to a
large hash table. Wu-Manber (WM) is a multiple pattern
matching algorithm. It has two phases, preprocessing
and scanning. In preprocessing phase, the minimum
pattern length is found. It constructs three tables,
namely, SHIFT, HASH and PREFIX. The SHIFT table
contains the safe shift distance. The HASH and PREFIX
tables are used for checking the full pattern against the
packet which is done in the scanning phase. In scanning
phase, the packet is scanned using a window of a certain
size. In Exhaust, the Bloom filter is inserted between
the SHIFT table and the HASH table. The HASH table
content is used to program the Bloom filter. During a
search of the attack signature, Exhaust slides a window
over the packet and calculates the hash function which
is the index of the SHIFT table. If the SHIFT table value
in the index is 0, then slide the window. Otherwise,
query the Bloom filter to check the presence of the
string in the HASH table. If Bloom filter returns true
negative, the window is shifted and the process is
repeated. When the Bloom filter returns true positive,
then the HASH and PREFIX tables are searched to find
the exact match.
Mosharraf et al. [32] proposed a responsive defense
mechanism against DDoS. The model applies Bloom
filter for implementing filtering close to the victim
host. The model uses signature for selecting the
reliable IP addresses. The signature is based on
Cumulative Distribution Function of the frequency of
each parameter. When the packets are received, scores
are assigned based on the frequency and the signature
of the selected features. The normal packets are
assigned higher score. An abnormal packet is initially
assigned a higher score, however, as the frequency of
the packets increases the score decreases. The victim
node transfers the Bloom filter to the upstream router
to provide the history of the IP address. The Bloom
filter is searched by the router when the packet is
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received. The Bloom filter helps the model by reducing
the communication cost and the space overhead to store
the IP address history.
3.2. Wireless Network
The wireless network has many issues and challenges
[18] which makes it soft target for attacks. Some of these
are Energy constraint, Bandwidth restriction, Scala-
bility, Limited Resources, Unreliable Communication,
Trust management, and Unattended Operations. In a
wireless network, the devices has a limited energy
and bandwidth usage. The bandwidth is susceptible
to some issues, such as, interference, signal influences,
and external noises. Moreover, the security methods
need to be implemented for both large and small scale
network. And, the limited resources in wireless devices
also restrict the implementation of complex security
mechanisms. The trust management is also difficult as
people share a lot of personal information on wire-
less devices. Furthermore, many sensor nodes, remain
unattended for a long time making them vulnerable to
attacks. Moreover, the wireless medium is open which
expose the services to eavesdroppers [52]. This leads to
insecure service interaction.
Wu et al. [47] proposed two schemes using the
counting Bloom Filter (CBF) to cramp down the SIP
attack in VoLTE. SIP [40] is a Session Initiation Protocol,
which is an application-layer signaling protocol. It is
used for establishment, management and termination
of communication sessions. SIP attack is done by
attacking the victim SIP proxy server with huge SIP
messages within a short period. First scheme uses
authentication and CBF. Every SIP message is to
be authenticated. Every SIP message carries a secret
key. VoLTE carrier releases the key which is updated
periodically. The key is the signature of each User
Equipment (UE) in VoLTE. These signatures are stored
in CBF. When an element comes IP Multimedia System
(IMS) server checks its presence in CBF. The CBF also
counts the number of messages to detect the occurrence
of an attack. However, it occupies more memory due
to which it cannot be used to detect multi-attribute
flooding attack. And, the CBF has the limitation of
counting at most 15 times for a signature. Second
scheme utilized a PFilter inspired by CBF. All the
messages are compacted to store in PFilter and the
outlier is found.
A Bloom-filter based IP-CHOCK detection method
[42] is proposed for the DDoS attacks in VANET. The
Bloom filter is used to design a detection algorithm
for making fast decision regarding filtering of vehicle
attack messages. The method has three phases, namely,
Detection Engine phase 1, Detection Engine phase
2, and Bloom-filter phase. First phase, checks all
received traffic information. Second phase, processes
the information received in the previous phase. A
legitimate IP address is stored in the database. If a
malicious IP address is detected, then it is sent to
Decision Engine (DE). Third phase, the Bloom filter
checks the DE and if a malicious IP address is verified
then it raises an alarm and sends the reference link to
every connected vehicle.
3.3. Cloud Computing
Cloud Computing is a technology based on network,
and its deployment model and services makes its
resources exposed to internal and external attacks
[27]. The main advantage to DDos attacker is the
virtualization feature of cloud computing. Some of
the DDoS attacks are VM sprawl attack, cloud-
internal DoS, and VM neighbor attacks. These attacks
misuse the VM migration. Currently, cloud computing
technology is mostly favored, IoT and Big Data
technology [45] are also depending more on it. The
heterogeneous IoT devices makes them vulnerable [44].
If a single attacker is able to access a single device
then DDoS attack can be done in the cloud to which
that device is connected. Hence, cloud computing
needs to focus on implementing the best security
mechanisms. In Big data technology, the privacy need
to be maintained while storing the data [38, 49].
Xiao et al. proposed a detection system having two
module detection framework [48] against DDoS attack.
This framework is designed for Software-Defined
Networking (SDN). The two modules are Collector and
the Detector. In the Collector module, the system scans
the flow table and collects traffic flow. The flow table is
obtained from the SDN network. And, the traffic flow
is collected using an IP header inspection. The Detector
module sniffers the entire network and collects all the
packets over the network. After receiving the packets,
the IP features are extracted. The extracted features are
checked with the Bloom Filter to detect the abnormal
flows. The Bloom filter helps in the storage of the host
information. It also helps to process large traffic in high
speed and stores the abnormal attack information.
Zhang et al. [51] proposed an efficient and robust
DDoS detection model for the cloud computing. First
check component monitors the UDP/TCP segment
and IP flow for abnormal packets. It does IP address
authentication using hop-count based filtering. Bloom
filter is used for efficient address query and data
storage. The Bloom filter is improved by taking a 2-Bits
array. First bit is similar to Bloom filter and second bit
groups stores the first pointer to the linked list. The
link list stores the nodes having same KEY . The node
stores the Source IP, hop-count and the timestamp. The
KEY represent the connection state of the transport
layer. The improved Bloom filter is an efficient data
structure for both TCP2HC and UDP2HC. It also
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supports efficient KEY searching and robust hop-count
abnormal check. The implementation of the improved
Bloom filter increases the performance of the check
component.
Again, Jian Zhang et al. proposed a Spark based
model for identifying abnormal packets [50] in Cloud
network. The detection model has three components.
First, the packet collector sends the packets to live
input stream by libpcap. Second, the Abnormal Check
component. It is implemented using pipelined task
processing and Spark streaming. The Spark streaming
analyzes the RDD among the DStreams. The filter,
map and reduce operations helps to compute the
authenticity of flow source in TCP/UDP and also
checks for abnormal packets. Third, the Decision
component based on Non-Parametric CUSUM. It
evaluates and makes decision of any aggressive
behavior. An improved Bloom filter is used for efficient
lookup and storage of connection state of transport
layer by HBase. The HBase stores the hop-count related
information. The improved Bloom Filter is a 2-bit array
where the first bit is Bloom Filter and the second bit
gives the RowID of HBASE based tables. The improved
Bloom Filter provides an efficient data structure to
TCP2HC and UDP2HC.
McHale et al. [28] proposed a model of pre-
classification of packets to classify the legitimate and
malicious traffic. The classification is based on the
known trusted flow. Bloom filter is used to classify
the packets into two queues, namely, Known Flows
and Unknown flows. The flows in the queues are
processed by Priority Scheduler. A Flow Cache is also
included in the model to improve the classification. This
cache stores flow locality within the active-flow window
which helps to take action for a given flow. A unique key
is extracted from the receiving packet. This key is given
to Bloom filter as input. If the Bloom filter returns false
positive, the packet enters the Unknown Flows queue.
If no packet is present in the Known Flows queue,
it is searched in the Flow Cache. If the Flow Cache
also returns false response, then the packet is sent for
processing through Table Selection, Flow Selection, and
Action Application stages for packet classification and
action-set application. During classification the Action
Application stage prioritizes a flow by inserting it into
Bloom filter and Flow Cache. The future packets of the
flow are stored in the Known Flow queue. To reduce
the false positive probability, the Bloom filter is flushed
after a certain number of insertions.
4. Key issues and challenges4.1. False Positive
False positive is a prominent issue in any kind of
Bloom Filter based solution. Reducing the false positive
probability is a grand challenge for the researchers.
A legal user may be starved by Bloom Filter due to
a false positive. Because, Bloom Filter does not know
about legal or illegal accesses. Moreover, Bloom Filter
is unaware of the access pattern. Hence, Bloom Filter
requires an external mechanism to defeat DDoS. A
designer must take utmost care of the access pattern.
4.2. Scalability
DDoS defender requires a highly scalable Bloom Filter.
Over a time period, Bloom Filter is filled with entries.
Bloom Filter stores packet information to defend the
DDoS attack. In a busy network, there are a humongous
number of packet flows. Thus, all information cannot be
accommodated by Bloom Filter. Therefore, scalability of
Bloom Filter becomes an issue. Nevertheless, the delete
operation removes the old items, however, it is not
fruitful in case of DDoS defending mechanism. Most
modern Bloom Filters are designed based on Flash/SSD
memory to increase high scalability. For example, Forest
Structured Bloom Filter [26], BloomStore [25], and
BloomFlash [9].
4.3. Unable to send a legitimate request
Bloom filter is used to store the malicious IP addresses.
However, the attacker may have used the IP without the
knowledge of the owner. Hence, the IP address is stored
in the Bloom filter during the DDoS attack. And, later
that IP address may never be able to send legitimate
request.
4.4. Flushing Bloom filter
One of the solution to above problem is flushing the
Bloom filter periodically. It also helps in keeping the
false positive probability low. However, flushing lead
to losing the information stored about the malicious
IP addresses. In addition, next time the malicious
IP address may not be identified as attacker site.
And, allowing packets from such sites makes the host
vulnerable.
4.5. Saturated Bloom Filter
IP traceback defense methods use a bloom filter to
store the information of the packets. Bloom filter is a
data structure having less space complexity. However,
storing lots of information of each packet may lead
to saturation of Bloom filter very quickly. A saturated
Bloom filter gives false positive results. Hence, a
decision on the features of the packet that is stored by
the Bloom filter need to be appropriate.
4.6. Delete operation
Bloom filter is used to store the IP address. In some
cases, the IP address need to be deleted from Bloom
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filter such as, no request from an IP address for a very
long time (may be months or years). However, delete
operation is not provided by all Bloom filters. Moreover,
deletion of an element of Bloom filter sometime leads to
false negative issue. Specially, the standard Bloom filter
which is mostly used in DDoS defense mechanisms does
not allow the deletion of the elements.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents the defending mechanism of DDoS
using Bloom Filter. Bloom filter is a dump data
structure, however, it helps to a great extend to tackle
the DDoS attack. In many mechanisms, there is a need
for a data structure that can store large number of
legitimate IP address. In some other cases, the packet
information need to be stored to prevent the abnormal
packets reaching the host. Hence, the good space and
time complexity improves security using such kind of
data structures. Moreover, many types of Bloom filters
are also available which can be modified to help in the
prevention of the DDoS attacks. As discussed in this
paper, Bloom Filter is a great data structure to prevent
DDoS attack, and enhance the system performance.
Moreover, Bloom Filter requires an external mechanism
to define to identify the DDoS attacks. Therefore, there
is a requirement for smart Bloom Filter that can learn
and identify patterns for DDoS and general purpose
applications. Also, a highly scalable Bloom Filter is
always called for.
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